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Ricci v. DeStefano: What It Means for Public Employers
I. Introduction
While the public perhaps knows more 
about Ricci v. DeStefano1  for Justice 
Sotomayor's involvement, public em-
ployers understand Ricci has a far 
greater impact than fodder for the 24-
hour news cycle. In Ricci, the Supreme 
Court addressed and decided an issue 
that many public employers are forced 
to address:  What does an employer do 
with an employment testing process 
where, despite its best efforts to make 
it non-discriminatory, the test results 
demonstrate it had a disparate impact 
on minorities? Can the employer 
throw out the test and try again?  Does 
the employer violate Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “Act”) if it 
does?  Will it violate the Act if it does 
not?
The Court has attempted to balance 
the Act's prohibitions on intentional 
and disparate impact discrimination 
by permitting an employer to take 
actions that otherwise would be 
considered intentionally discrimina-
tory where it has a “strong basis in 
evidence” to believe that it would face 
disparate impact liability if it did not 
do so.  For New Haven, Connecticut 
(the “City”), that meant its decision 
not to certify tests violated the Act 
because the City lacked a strong basis 
in evidence to believe it would face
disparate impact liability.
Public employers now have a 
standard they can rely upon when 
faced with this situation.  Whether 
any employer can apply the standard 
with any confidence that it will not be 
sued and, if sued, that it will be 
successful, is another question.  Yet 
public employers must learn the 
lessons of Ricci, for its effects extend 
far beyond promotions and its full 
impact has yet to be seen.
II. The Facts
The City of New Haven is the lead 
player in what could be considered a 
modern Greek tragedy.2  It wanted to 
do the right thing, to run objective fire 
lieutenant and captain promotional 
tests that would be completely non-
discriminatory and also comply with: 
(i) civil service rules setting forth a 
rule of three for promotions; and (ii) a 
union collective bargaining agree-
ment requiring that sixty percent of 
the exam be the results of  a written 
test and the remaining forty percent 
be an oral exam.3 The City hired an 
experienced outside consulting firm, 
Industrial/Organizational Solutions 
(IOS), to develop and administer the 
examinations.4
IOS performed job analyses, inter-
viewed employees, did questionnaires, 
and even engaged in ride-alongs in 
developing the test.  At every stage, 
IOS over sampled  minority firefighters 
to ensure that the results would not 
unintentionally favor white appli-
cants.5    For the written exam, all of 
the questions came from City-
approved training manuals and 
applicants were told the chapters from 
which questions were drawn and given 
ample time to study.6
From the job analyses, IOS drafted 
hypothetical firefighting situations to 
test applicants in the oral exam.  To 
staff the nine three-member assessor 
panels, IOS retained experienced 
higher ranking fire officers from 
similar, out-of-state departments. 
IOS trained them on how to 
administer the exam, and each panel 
consisted of a Caucasian, Hispanic, 
and an African-American.7
Despite the City's efforts, the test 
results showed the process had a 
disparate impact on minorities.  For 
the lieutenant's exam,  forty-three 
whites, nineteen blacks and fifteen 
Hispanics completed the exam, yet 
twenty-five whites (58.1 percent), 
sixteen blacks (31.6 percent) and 
thirteen Hispanics (20 percent) passed. 
For the captain's exam, twenty-five 
whites, eight blacks and eight 
Hispanics completed the exam, yet 
sixteen whites (64 percent), three 
blacks (37.5 percent) and three 
Hispanics (37.5 percent) passed.8  The 
disparities fell well below the eighty 
percent standard set by the EEOC to 
implement the Act's disparate impact 
provisions.9 Moreover, given the civil 
service rule requiring that promotions 
be made from the top three candidates, 
if the promotion lists were certified, all
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eight vacant lieutenant positions 
would be filled by whites, and of the 
seven captain vacancies, at best two 
Hispanics and no blacks could be 
promoted.10
City officials were concerned, and 
the City's Civil Service Board (CSB) 
held five meetings/hearings over
whether to certify the results.11    City 
officials presented evidence, as did 
firefighters (for and against), repre-
sentatives of the local union and the 
International Association of Black 
Firefighters.12  The CSB further in-
vited three other witnesses to provide 
additional opinions.  The first, an IOS 
competitor, claimed that the results 
showed a very high disparate impact, 
but admitted the disparity was 
generally within the range of what he 
sees professionally.  He made several 
suggestions to improve the process, 
including changing the weights given 
to the portions of the exam, and 
possibly in the future running an 
assessment center instead.13 The 
second witness, an African American 
federal fire program specialist who 
also was a retired Michigan fire 
captain, opined that the applicants 
should have known the materials upon 
which they were questioned. He 
concluded any disparate impact was 
likely due to whites outperforming 
some minorities on testing or because 
more whites took the exam.14  The final 
witness, a college professor whose 
primary field of expertise was not 
firefighting, but race and culture as 
they influence performance on tests, 
opined that no matter what test the 
City used it would have revealed a 
disparity.15
After hearing the evidence, the CSB 
did not certify the test results.16 
Plaintiffs, seventeen white firefighters 
and one Hispanic, brought suit, 
alleging among other claims violations 
of the Act and the 14th Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause.17  The dis-
trict court ruled for the City on 
summary judgment, finding that the 
City's “motivation to avoid making 
promotions based on a test with a 
racially disparate impact . . . does not, 
as a matter of law, constitute 
discriminatory intent under Title 
VII.”18 The court determined that the 
City's actions were not “based on race”
since all applicants took the same test, 
and thus the result was the same for 
all when the results were discarded.19 
The Second Circuit affirmed the 
decision in a now famous one-
paragraph opinion,20 and a petition for 
rehearing en banc was narrowly 
denied.21
III. The Decision
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court 
reversed,22  finding that the City had 
violated Title VII by failing to certify 
the test results.23  The Court believed 
that the City's actions violated Title 
VII’s disparate-treatment prohibitions 
“absent some valid defense.”24 The 
Court rejected the lower court's 
finding of no discriminatory action, 
declaring that the decision not to 
certify the examination results be-
cause of the statistical disparity based 
on race was violative race-based 
decision-making:
Whatever the City’s ultimate aim 
– however well intentioned or 
benevolent it might have seemed –
the City made its employment 
decision because of race.  The City 
rejected the test results solely 
because the higher scoring candi-
dates were white.  The question is 
not whether that conduct was 
discriminatory but whether the 
City had a lawful justification for 
its race-based action.25
The Court then considered when an 
employer can take a race-based action 
to avoid possibly engaging in unlawful 
disparate treatment. The Court re-
jected claims that it would never be 
appropriate to take action to avoid a 
disparate treatment violation, because 
the Act prohibits both types of conduct 
and must therefore be interpreted to 
give effect to both provisions.26 Nor did 
it accept claims that such a defense 
should only work if the employer was 
“in fact” in violation of the Act's 
disparate treatment prohibition, for 
that would run counter with Congress's 
intent to encourage employers to 
voluntarily comply with the Act.27
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Similarly, the Court rejected claims 
that an employer’s “good faith belief”
should be sufficient to justify race-
conscious conduct.28   The majority felt 
this approach would go too far, 
especially since Congress when it 
codified disparate impact prohibitions 
in the 1991 Civil Rights Act made no 
exception for disparate treatment 
actions taken in good faith to avoid 
disparate impact violations. The Court 
feared such a minimal standard would 
encourage race-based action at the 
slightest hint of disparate impact, give 
rise to a de facto quota system where 
results were tossed based solely on 
statistics, and could give license to 
employers to toss results where they 
did not comport with their preferred 
racial balance.29
Instead, the Court looked to 
precedent under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment for a 
standard that “strikes a more 
appropriate balance” when reconciling 
competing obligations.30 There, “cer-
tain governmental actions to remedy 
past racial discrimination – actions 
that themselves are based on race  –
are constitutional only where there is 
a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that the 
remedial actions were necessary.”31 
This standard met the Court's goals of 
giving effect to and reconciling both 
the Act's disparate treatment and 
disparate impact provisions while 
encouraging employers to voluntarily 
comply with the law without giving 
them license to make race-based 
decisions at will:
Applying the strong-basis-in-evi-
dence standard to Title VII gives 
effect to both the disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact 
provisions, allowing violations of 
one in the name of compliance with 
the other only in certain, narrow 
circumstances.The standard leaves 
ample room for employers' volun-
tary compliance efforts, which are 
essential to the statutory scheme 
and to Congress's efforts to 
eradicate workplace discrimina-
tion.  . . . And the standard
appropriately constrains employ-
ers’ discretion in making race-
based decisions:  It limits that 
discretion to cases in which there 
is a strong basis in evidence of 
disparate-impact liability, but it is 
not so restrictive that it allows 
employers to act only when there is 
a provable, actual violation.
Resolving the statutory conflict in 
this way allows the disparate-
impact prohibition to work in a 
manner that is consistent with 
other provisions of Title VII, 
including the prohibition on 
adjusting employment-related test 
scores on the basis of race. See [42 
U.S.C.] § 2000e-2(l). ]32
Under that standard, the Court 
found that the City had violated the 
Act, for the record "makes clear there 
is no support for the conclusion that 
respondents had an objective, strong 
basis in evidence to find the tests 
inadequate, with some consequent 
disparate impact liability in violation 
of Title VII."33   While admittedly the 
significant adverse impact here 
constituted a prima facie case of 
disparate impact liability, that and 
nothing more "is far from a strong 
basis in evidence that the City would 
have been liable under Title VII had it 
certified the results."34  The City could 
only have been liable for disparate 
impact discrimination if, in addition, 
the exams were not job related and 
consistent with business necessity, or 
if there existed an equally valid, less-
discriminatory alternative that served 
the City's needs but that the City 
refused to adopt.35
Here the examinations were job-
related and consistent with business 
necessity.36   With regard to valid less-
discriminatory alternatives, the Court 
rejected, among others: (i) utilizing a 
different composite score (scores were 
contractual, no basis to conclude this 
was an equally valid alternative that 
could have been adopted), (ii) reinter-
preting the "rule of three" to provide for 
banding (if done after knowing the
results the City would have violated 
Title VII's prohibition on adjusting 
test results based on race); and (iii) the 
use of assessment centers (the record 
reference of this possibility did not 
raise a factual question as to whether 
the option was available or if it would 
have had a less adverse impact).37 
Discarding the tests was violative, and 
"[f]ear of litigation alone cannot justify 
an employer's reliance on race to the 
detriment of individuals who passed 
the examinations and qualified for 
promotions."38
The dissent challenged the 
majority's attempt to place the core 
directives ("twin pillars") of Title VII –
disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment – at odds with each other.39 The 
dissent rejected the idea that an 
employer that changes an employ-
ment practice in an effort to comply 
with the Act’s disparate impact 
provision acts “because of race.”
Instead, the dissent would hold that an 
employer who jettisons a selection 
device when its disproportionate racial 
impact becomes apparent does not 
violate the disparate treatment bar 
automatically or at all, provided the 
“employer must have good cause to 
believe the device would not withstand 
examination for business necessity.”40
The dissent also attacked the 
strong-basis-in-evidence standard.  The 
dissent questioned the utility of the 
standard, given that the Equal 
Protection Clause lacks a similar 
disparate impact component, and the 
distinguishable cases upon which the 
majority relied involved constitutional 
challenges to absolute racial prefer-
ences where race was the decisive 
factor.41   The dissent took issue with 
the standard itself, the lack of 
elaboration on how it was to be applied, 
and how the lack of certainty may 
discourage voluntary compliance.42 
The dissent warned that any employer 
attempting to meet this standard 
could expect costly disparate treat-
ment litigation where its chances for
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success would be “highly problematic.”
Indeed, the dissent questioned how 
this standard was any different from 
requiring the employer to establish a 
provable,   actual violation against 
itself, something justices have frowned 
upon in the past.43
The dissent believed the City had 
ample "good cause" to believe its 
selection process was flawed and thus 
did not violate Title VII.44 In 
particular, the dissent attacked the 
City's blind use of the contractually 
mandated testing requirements and 
weighting, when apparently no consid-
eration was given to determining 
whether either the tests or their 
weighting were likely to identify the 
most qualified candidates.  The dissent 
cited evidence that assessment centers 
were commonplace and better able to 
identify the qualified candidates, as 
well as precedent demonstrating that 
written exams were not probative of a 
firefighter's leadership and fire skills.45 
The dissent also took issue with the 
City's constraints on the exams' 
creation, which deprived the City of 
possible alternatives such as an 
assessment center, and prevented the 
consultant from its usual practice of 
showing the written test to actual City 
fire officials to insure the questions 
were truly appropriate for the City.46 
In light of these and other factors the 
dissent believed City had good cause to 
believe its testing process would not 
withstand a disparate impact claim.47
IV. Decisions Since Ricci
Cases since Ricci have yet to apply the 
new defense in a disparate treatment, 
disparate impact case. Two early 
cases, however, are of note.  First, in 
United States v. City of New York,48 a 
district court found on summary 
judgment that the New York City's 
written firefighter examinations vio-
lated the Act's disparate impact 
provision.  The court made a point of 
emphasizing that Ricci was not 
controlling as to whether a testing
process “actually had” a disparate 
impact on minority candidates, and 
that the City of New York had taken 
significantly fewer steps than New 
Haven to validate its exam.49   No  
doubt, however, employers facing 
disparate impact claims will try to 
analogize their hiring processes to 
New Haven's.
Second,  Ricci already has been 
utilized as support for ending a 
consent decree to correct prior 
discrimination. In Cleveland Fire 
Fighters for Fair Hiring Practices v. 
City of Cleveland,50  the court was 
asked to extend the City’s time to 
comply with a consent decree dating 
back to 1977 (and amended thereafter) 
to increase the ratio of minority 
firefighters.  Over the years the city 
had increased its minority firefighter 
percentage from four percent to 
twenty-six percent, but due to 
economically caused layoffs and state 
pension changes that encouraged 
firefighters not to retire, the City was 
not able to meet the hiring and 
diversity goals of the latest amended 
decree.51  The City and other interested 
parties sought an extension of the 
decree, and others argued the decree 
should expire.  The parties actually 
agreed to extend the decree to 2014,52 
but the court at a status on the very 
day Ricci issued53  advised the parties 
that the proposed stipulation was 
unacceptable, and that if a new 
proposal was not submitted it would 
rule on the competing motions.
When the parties could not reach 
agreement, the court terminated the 
case.  The court considered its case 
similar to Ricci, in that “what is 
integral here is the administration of 
an examination, as part of an overall 
hiring process, that is fair to all people 
– regardless of race.54   The court saw 
Ricci as a reminder of how far the 
nation has come from the origination 
of affirmative action in the 1960s, how 
much progress has been made in 
places like Cleveland, and how courts
struggle to find the proper balance to 
ensure equal opportunity between 
minorities and non-minorities alike.55 
Here, the court found that the City had 
made a good faith effort to comply with 
the remedy designed to correct past 
discrimination, circumstances beyond 
its control caused it to fall short of the 
consent decree's goal, the City had in 
place a nondiscriminatory hiring 
procedure that will be fair to all and 
that will lead to increased minority 
hiring, and, therefore, judicial moni-
toring was no longer necessary.56   The 
court also recognized that, had it 
accepted the parties’ agreed extension, 
the decree would have been in place for 
41 years since the case had first been 
filed –  i.e., “no one that would be 
affected by the intervention of this 
Court would even have been born at 
the time the case was filed.”57
V. Lessons From Ricci
How long Ricci will remain the law is 
anyone's guess given it is yet another 
5-4 decision, and Congress has become 
active in changing decisions it does not 
like.  Public employers, however, must 
assume that Ricci will remain the law, 
and recognize and learn from the 
decision.
Lesson 1:
The time to develop and evaluate an 
examination process to insure it is 
non-discriminatory, has no disparate 
impact, and is job-related and con-
sistent with business necessity is 
before the exam is implemented.
Above all, Ricci reminds employers 
that the time to develop, evaluate and 
validate a test to insure it is job 
related, non-discriminatory, and does 
not disadvantage minorities is before a 
test is administered.  As the Court 
recognized:  “Title VII does not prohibit 
an employer from considering, before 
administering a test or practice, how 
to design that test or practice in order 
to provide a fair opportunity for all 
individuals, regardless of their race.”58
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To the extent New Haven erred, it was 
by trying to throw out the test after it 
had already been given.59   Modifying 
the scoring or results after the fact 
similarly would have been found 
violative.
Employers should take steps to 
avoid disparities in test results before 
a test is implemented.  Among many 
options: (1)  establish a pilot program 
to assess whether the early returns 
suggest an adverse impact; (2) engage 
a testing expert who can provide 
background on which types of test tend 
to produce disparate impacts; (3) build 
more flexibility into the process, such 
as by limiting the weight given to 
written exams or establishing bands 
for test results to give the employer 
more leeway and discretion.  Employ-
ers should work with testing profes-
sionals to insure whatever process 
ultimately adopted is validated.
Granted, it may not always be 
possible to accurately assess whether a 
test will statistically disadvantage a 
protected group before implementa-
tion.  Extra precautions taken on the 
front end, however, will at least help 
defend against a disparate impact 
claim.  To this end, employers also 
should closely examine which test 
would best reflect on the skills needed 
for the job. Employers should not 
assume that a test is legitimate simply 
because another community uses the 
same test for a similar position, or 
because a union contract dictates the 
process.  Each test must be narrowly 
crafted to fit the job requirements.
Lesson 2:
 The defense goes both ways
At the end of its opinion, the 
majority provided New Haven a "silver 
lining" in its decision:
Our holding today clarifies how 
Title VII applies to resolve 
competing expectations under the 
disparate-treatment and dispar-
ate-impact provisions.  If, after it 
certifies the test results, the City 
faces a disparate-impact suit, then 
in light of our holding today it
should be clear that the City 
would avoid disparate-impact 
liability based on the strong basis 
in evidence that, had it not 
certified the results, it would have 
been subject to disparate-treat-
ment liability.60
Thus, an employer facing disparate 
impact claims apparently also may 
raise a defense that it promoted or 
hired people based on the tests because 
it had a strong basis in evidence that, 
had it not done so, it would have been 
liable for disparate treatment.
Assuming that the majority is 
correct, and that one need not actually 
prove a violation to meet the strong 
basis in evidence test, does this give an 
employer in close cases the license to 
decide what it wants to do, as opposed 
to what may actually be the right 
decision legally?  After all, in a close 
case wouldn't there be a strong basis in 
evidence that a violation occurred 
under either a disparate impact or a 
disparate treatment theory?  Courts 
will have to address this.
Lesson 3:
The dissent has a point.  What 
will it take to demonstrate a 
strong basis in evidence?
The   Ricci Court held that an 
employer could throw out test results 
based on race only if it had a “strong 
basis in evidence” that (1) its test was 
“deficient” and (2) “discarding the 
results [was] necessary to avoid 
violating the disparate impact clause.”61 
Even though the test results reflected 
a significant racial imbalance, and the 
City held multiple meetings wherein it 
received feedback that the test 
potentially could be improved, the 
Court still found no genuine issue of 
material fact that there was no “strong 
basis in evidence” to justify discarding 
the test.  While the majority expressly 
rejected finding an employer can  avoid 
liability only if it can prove disparate 
impact discrimination would have 
occurred, the dissent argues that that 
may ultimately be what it takes to
meet the strong basis in evidence 
standard.
Given the lack of explanation as to 
what may be required, lower courts 
eventually will have to decide how 
much an employer will need to reach 
the “strong basis in evidence”
standard.  In the meantime, a public 
employer facing test results demon-
strating a prima facie case of disparate 
impact discrimination is, after Ricci, 
in not much better shape than New 
Haven in terms of its options.  Any 
action taken likely will lead to 
litigation, and the employer will be 
forced to decide whether to defend the 
test or defend the decision to ignore the 
test.  In either case, apparently, the 
employer can raise this new defense –
but that again begs the question of 
proof.
If an employer fears litigation, it 
should develop a portfolio of evidence 
reflecting that it has a “strong basis” to 
believe that it would be liable if it did 
not take the action it did. The 
employer will likely want to retain a 
recognized testing expert to carefully 
review the test program and test 
results, analyze testing alternatives, 
and issue a full report.  The employer 
also may wish to hire an experienced 
labor and employment attorney (or 
even a retired judge) to obtain a legal 
opinion as to whether it likely would be 
liable, and be prepared to waive the 
privilege and rely on that report if 
sued. The goal is to develop a solid 
evidentiary case that the employer had 
no choice but to take the action it did or 
else be liable for discrimination.
Lesson 4:
Ricci's analysis extends beyond 
promotions to any situation where 
disparate impact applies.  Hiring 
processes clearly are covered, and as in 
Cleveland Fire Fighters, the rationale 
even may be of use in evaluating 
ongoing consent decrees regarding 
discriminatory practices.
Ricci extends beyond 
promotions
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NotesOne particular concern for public 
employers given the current economic 
recession is reductions-in-force.  Of-
ten, reductions-in-force proceed as 
follows: (1) the employer asks 
managers to evaluate candidates for 
reduction in several categories such as 
experience and skill, (2) the employer 
creates a preliminary list of those to be 
laid off, (3) the employer runs 
statistical analyses to detect whether 
the tentative reduction plan would 
disparately impact those in protected 
classes, and (4) the employer “subtly”
encourages managers to reconsider 
their earlier ratings in the event that 
the numbers suggest a disparate 
impact.  The reason is simple:  the 
threat of class action disparate impact 
lawsuits far outweigh the risk that a 
non-minority might sue.  Given Ricci, 
such post-hoc manipulation of the 
numbers carries much more risk. 
Public employers need to be very 
careful about how they structure 
reductions.
VI. Conclusion
The fall-out from Ricci is not over. 
Public employers continue to face 
disparate impact claims over testing 
processes.   They now have a defense to 
taking controversial actions to avoid 
feared discrimination claims, but as 
the dissent notes it may be very hard to 
prove.  Someone is going to have to 
litigate the parameters of the defense –
and eventually the courts will have to 
set some clear guidelines for employers 
to follow. ?
1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (June 29, 2009).
2. At least if one reads the majority 
opinion.  The dissent claims the City's 
test had “multiple flaws,” that 
“[f]irefighting is a profession in which 
the legacy of racial discrimination 
casts a long shadow,”the City “perva-
sively discriminated against minori-
ties,” and that it had been the subject 
of a discrimination lawsuit and result-
ing settlement agreement in 1975.  Id. 
at 2690-91.  Justice Alito, in his con-
curring opinion, claims the record al-
legedly contained evidence that could 
lead a jury to find that the City’s dis-
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ing rehearing en banc).
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Alito joining. 129 S. Ct at 2664-2681. 
Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, as 
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joined. Id at 2681-2683. Ginsburg 
filed the dissent, which Stevens, 
Souter and Breyer joined. Id. at 2689-
2710.
23. In so doing, the Court declined to 
rule on the Equal Protection claims. 
Id. at 2681.
24. Id. at 2673. 
25. Id. at 2674. 
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2674-75.
29. Id. at 2675; Civil Rights Act of 
1991, PUB. L. NO. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071 (1991).
30. Id. at 2675.
31. Id. at 2675 (citing Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) 
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 
476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality 
opinion).
32. 129 S. Ct. at 2676 (citation omit-
ted).
33. Id. at 2677. 
34. Id. at 2678.
35. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), 
(C).
36. 129 S. Ct. at 2678. 
37. Id. at 2679-81.
38. Id. at 2681. 
39. Id. at 2699.
40. Id. (emphasis added). 
41. Id. at 2700-01.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2701-02. 
44. Id. at 2703. 
45. Id. at 2704-05.
46. Id. at 2706. 
47. Id. at 2707.
48. 637 F. Supp.2d 77 (E.D.N.Y. July 
22, 2009).
49. Id. at 83-84 (emphasis in original). 
50.  2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74221 (Au-
gust 20, 2009).
51. Id. at *17-19, 26, 35-36, 37. 
52. Id. at *19-25.
53. The record does not indicate 
whether the decision actually had is-
sued prior to the status.
54. Id. at *38-41. 
55. Id. at *41. 
56. Id. at *44-45. 
57. Id. at *43.
58. 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
59. Id. at 2677.
60. 129 S. Ct. at 2681 (emphasis 
added).
61. Id. at 2676. ?
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Recent 
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular feature
of The Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report. It highlights recent legal develop-
ments of interest to the public employment 
relations community. This issue focuses on 
developments under the two collective 
bargaining statutes and the equal employ-
ment opportunity laws.
IELRA Developments
Failure to Comply with Arbitra-
tion Award Ruling Reversed
In   Griggsville-Perry Federation of 
Support Personnel v. IFT-AFT, Local 
No. 4141, No. 2009-CA-0027-S (IELRB 
2009), the IELRB reversed and 
remanded to the arbitrator an ALJ's 
decision that Griggsville-Perry Com-
munity Unit School District No. 4 
("District") violated the IELRA by 
refusing to comply with a binding 
arbitration award.
On September 11, 2009, the ALJ 
issued a Recommended Decision and 
Order, concluding that the arbitration 
award – which had ordered reinstate-
ment of an employee – after the 
arbitrator found her dismissal to be 
"procedurally and substantively arbi-
trary," was binding.  The District filed 
exceptions, arguing that the arbitra-
tor had exceeded his authority under 
the CBA by imposing a "reasonable 
cause" standard for discharge where 
none had been bargained.  The District 
cited  Board of Educ. of Harrisburg 
Community Unit School District No. 
3 v. IELRB, 277 Ill. App. 3d 208 (4th 
Dist. 1992), in which the Appellate 
Court found that an arbitrator had 
exceeded his authority by requiring 
"just cause" for dismissal where the 
CBA contained no such requirement
and where the parties' bargaining 
history indicated that the employer 
had specifically refused to adopt such a 
requirement. The Appellate Court 
remanded the case to the IELRB to 
remand to the arbitrator, with 
instructions to  not apply a “just case”
requirement and to fashion a remedy, 
finding that the arbitrator had failed 
to properly considered Harrisburg.
Failure to Comply with Arbitra-
tion Award Ruling Upheld
In Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers #197 v. Illinois State 
University, Case No. 2009-CA-0001-S, 
the IELRB upheld the Administrative 
Law Judge's (ALJ) determination that 
Illinois State University (ISU) vio-
lated the IELRA by failing to comply 
with a binding arbitration award and 
that IBEW was not entitled to 
attorney's fees.
IBEW filed a grievance against 
ISU alleging non-compliance with the 
collective bargaining agreement 
("Agreement").  The grievance pro-
ceeded to arbitration pursuant to the 
procedures outlined in the Agreement. 
The arbitrator ruled in favor of IBEW 
and ordered ISU to give specific 
assignments to electricians, instead of 
repair workers.  One month after the 
decision, ISU informed IBEW that it 
would not comply with the arbitrator's 
decision and IBEW promptly filed an 
unfair labor practice charge.
The IELRB concluded that ISU 
violated Sections 14(a)(8) and, deriva-
tively, 14(a)(1) and that the ALJ had 
properly rejected the University's four 
defenses to non-compliance with the 
arbitration  award.  The Board cited 
the United States Supreme Court for 
the proposition that when the parties 
have contracted to have disputes 
settled by an arbitrator, a court cannot 
simply reject an arbitrator's decision 
simply because it disagrees.  United 
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 
(1987). The Board also stated that 
illinois courts consistently refer to 
public policy rationales for favoring 
resolution of collective bargaining 
disputes through arbitration. 
(“[B]ecause the parties have chosen by 
contractual agreement how their 
dispute is to be decided, and judicial 
modification of an arbitrator's decision 
deprives parties of their choice.”) 
AFSCME v. Dept. of Central Mgm't 
Services, 173 Ill.2d 299, 671 N.E.2d 
668 (1996).  The IELRB considers the 
following to determine whether Sec-
tion 14(a)(8) has been violated: (1) 
whether there is a binding arbitration 
award; (2) the content of the award, 
and (3) whether there has been 
compliance with the award.
IELRB ordered a cease and desist 
and affirmatively ordered ISU to (1) 
comply with the arbitration award; (2) 
make the electricians whole (with 
interest at a rate of seven percent); (3) 
make available to the Board copies of 
records and reports necessary to 
analyze the amount due; (4) post  for 
sixty days a 'Notice to Employees' of 
the Order; and (5) report in writing 
within thirty-five days the steps taken 
to comply with the order.
Despite upholding the arbitration 
award, the Board affirmed denial of 
IBEW's motion for attorney's fees.  The 
Board stated that attorney's fees are 
granted only in “egregious circum-
stances” and such sanctions had been 
ordered only three times in the last 25 
years.  The Board agreed with the ALJ 
that ISU's reasons for non-compliance 
did not amount to frivolous litigation, 
even though its defenses were not 
meritorious.
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In the consolidated cases, Yurevich 
and State of Illinois, Department of 
Central Management Services, Case 
No. S-CA-09-058 (ILRB State Panel, 
2009) and Pugh and State of Illinois, 
Department of Central Management 
Services S-CA-09-062 (ILRB State 
Panel, 2009), the State Panel 
addressed the procedural issue of 
timeliness in filings with the Board. 
The Board upheld an ALJ’s decision 
finding that the Department of 
Central Management Services (“State”) 
had violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act 
by discharging the charging parties. 
The ALJ found that the State had 
defaulted by filing its answer to the 
charging parties' complaint two days 
late.  The ALJ accepted the admissions 
set forth in the complaint as true, 
concluded that the State had violated 
the Act, and ordered that the charging 
parties be reinstated.
The State filed exceptions arguing 
that the ALJ abused her discretion 
because a two day delay did not 
prejudice the complaining parties and 
also that the ALJ should have granted 
a variance under Section 1200.160 of 
the Board’s rules.  The Board rejected 
both exceptions noting that there were 
no “extraordinary circumstances”
which would have justified the State's 
delay.  Specifically, the Board faulted 
the State for  failing to attach proof of 
service to its answer and for using the 
State's internal mail system instead of 
the U.S. Postal Service, thereby 
making it “virtually impossible to 
ascertain” when the answer was 
actually mailed.
Timeliness of Filings with the 
Board
to advance facts that, if proved, would 
entitle it to prevail, the Board need not 
convene a hearing.  Accordingly, the 
initial ALJ directed the Employer to 
make an offer of proof as to each 
disputed employee for the purpose of 
determining whether the Employer 
could establish a prima facie case for 
exclusion so as to warrant a hearing. 
The Employer submitted offers as to 
102 employees.  Thereafter, the Board 
directed a representation election, but 
the Employer impounded the ballots 
pending resolution of the disputed 
positions.  It then submitted offers of 
proof as to the remaining 221 disputed 
employees.
The Board agreed with a substi-
tuted ALJ that the Employer was 
entitled to a hearing as to 74 of the 
disputed employees, but it further 
found that the Employer had estab-
lished the existence of questions of fact 
or law warranting a hearing as to the 
exempt status of another six of the 
disputed employees. Because the offers 
of proof regarding the remaining 243 
disputed employees did not make out a 
prima facie case for exclusion, the 
Board held that the Employer was not 
entitled to hearing regarding the 
exempt status of those employees.
IPLRA Developments
Police Sergeants Found to be 
Public Employees
In  Metropolitan Alliance of Police, 
Sergeants Chapter No. 534 and 
Village of Oak Brook, No. S-RC-09-057 
(ISLRB 2009), the State Panel held 
that police officers in the rank of 
sergeant were public employees within 
the meaning of the Illinois Public 
Labor Relations Act and certified the 
Metropolitan Alliance of Police as their 
exclusive representative. The Admin-
istrative Law Judge determined that 
the sergeants were not excluded under 
the Act’s supervisory exemption 
because they did not have authority to 
perform any of the statutory indicia of 
supervisory authority with the requi-
site independent judgment.The village 
filed exceptions.
To qualify as supervisors under the 
Act, peace officers must perform work 
that is substantially different from 
that of subordinates, have authority to 
perform at least one of 11 enumerated 
supervisory functions, and consis-
tently exercise independent judgment 
in connection with supervisory activi-
ties.  The Village argued, inter alia, 
that the sergeants were statutory 
supervisors because they had signifi-
cant discretionary authority to affect 
subordinates’ terms and conditions of 
employment through performance 
evaluations.  The ALJ found that the 
evaluations had a direct effect on 
annual pay increases, but denied that 
the sergeants exercised the requisite 
independent judgment in completing 
the evaluations where they were 
jointly prepared by two or three 
sergeants or a sergeant and a 
lieutenant.  Because the evaluations 
had to be submitted to Lieutenants in 
all cases, sergeants did not exercise 
supervisory authority merely by 
completing them.
In  American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees,
Council 31 and State of Illinois, 
Department of Central Management 
Services, No. S-RC-08-036 (ISLRB 
2009), the Union filed a representation 
petition to represent 1,250 employees 
of the Department of Central Manage-
ment Services ("Employer") in the 
classification of Public Service Admin-
istrator.  The Employer argued that 
323 of the employees were excluded 
from coverage of the Illinois Public 
Labor Relations Act under the 
exemptions for supervisory, confiden-
tial, or managerial employees and that 
it was entitled to a hearing on the 
matter. Under American Federation 
of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, Council 31 and State of 
Illinois 24  ¶ PERI 112 (IL LRB-SP
2008), if a party before the Board fails
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obtaining the 2007 opinion letter 
violated the duty to bargain.  Simi-
larly, the Board found that adherence 
to the terms of the arbitration award 
could not be viewed as disturbing the 
status quo. Therefore, despite the 
apparent bad faith on the part of the 
Village, the Union’s charges were 
dismissed.
Status Quo During Interest 
Arbitration
In International Association of Fire 
Fighters, Local 95 and Village of Oak 
Park, Case No. S-CA-07-085 (ILRB 
State Panel, 2009), the State Panel 
upheld an ALJ's order dismissing an 
unfair labor practice complaint alleg-
ing a unilateral change in a 
mandatory subject of bargaining in 
violation of Sections 10(a)(4) and 14(l) 
of the Act.  IAFF, Local 95 (“Union”) 
alleged that the Village of Oak Park 
(“Village”) violated the Act when 
during the pendency of interest 
arbitration it unilaterally, and with-
out notice to the Union, ceased paying 
a 15 percent longevity benefit.
 The Village argued that it was 
justified in suspending payment of the 
longevity benefit based on the terms of 
an interest arbitration award, which 
specifically provided that if a third 
party with jurisdiction were to find the 
longevity payment was not considered 
wages for purposes of calculating 
pension benefits, the benefit would 
revert back to the terms outlined in a 
prior contract.   The arbitration award 
indicated that such a reversion was 
only a remote possibility.  However in 
2007, the Village actively solicited, 
and ultimately received, an opinion 
from the Illinois Department of 
Financial and Professional Regulation 
(“IDFPR”) which found that treating 
the 15 percent longevity bonus as 
salary was in fact inconsistent with 
the pension code, thereby triggering 
the reversionary language in the 
parties’ interest arbitration award.
The Board acknowledged that 
under Sections 10(a)(4) and 14(l) the 
parties were required to maintain the 
status quo while at impasse, and 
throughout the period of impasse, in 
terms of the  procedures outlined in 
Section 14 of the Act for security 
employees such as firefighters.   How-
ever, the Board found no merit in the 
Union's claims that surreptitiously
In Serwatka v. Rockwell Automa-
tion, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010), 
the Seventh Circuit considered whether 
a plaintiff may establish liability 
under the ADA by proof that the 
employer was motivated by both 
lawful and unlawful reasons.  The 
court held that the United States 
Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 
S.Ct. 2343 (2009), foreclosed mixed-
motive analysis in the ADA context.
In Gross, the Supreme Court held 
that because Congress failed to amend 
the ADEA to explicitly authorize 
recovery under a mixed-motive theory 
in age discrimination claims when it 
amended Title VII to permit such 
recovery, proof that age was simply a 
motivating factor in an employer's 
decision could not suffice to establish 
liability under the ADEA. The Seventh 
Circuit in Serwatka read Gross to 
suggest that when an anti-discrimina-
tion statute lacks language authoriz-
ing mixed-motive recovery, such 
claims are not viable under that 
statute. Because there was no provi-
sion in the ADA akin to Title VII's 
mixed-motive provision, the court held 
that the ADA renders employers liable 
for age discrimination only to 
plaintiffs who prove "but for" causa-
tion between the adverse employment 
action and the plaintiff's actual or 
perceived disability. The court re-
jected the argument that ADA § 
12117(a), granting plaintiffs the same 
"powers, remedies, and procedures set 
forth in [Title VII §§ 2000e-4 - 2000e-
Seventh Circuit Employment 
Law Update
9]," permitted a court to cross-
reference Title VII's mixed-motive 
liability provision. The court reasoned 
that "although [§ 12117(a)] cross 
references the remedies set forth in 
[Title VII] for mixed-motives cases, it 
does not cross reference [Title VII § 
2000e-2(m)], which renders employers 
liable for mixed-motive employment 
decisions." 591 F.3d 957 at 962 
(original emphasis).
Applying the "but for" causation 
requirement, the Seventh Circuit 
vacated the district court's award of 
declaratory and injunctive relief, 
along with a portion of attorney's fees 
and costs, since the award was based 
solely the jury's mixed-motive finding.
In  Serafinn v. Local 722, Int'l 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 5279 (7th Cir. 2010), the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed for abuse of 
discretion a United States District 
Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois rejection of Local 722's 
proposed jury instruction that would 
permit the Local to avoid liability for 
impairing the free speech rights of an 
ex-president if it could show that it 
would have disciplined him even if he 
had not engaged in protected speech. 
The Seventh Circuit held that the 
district court committed no prejudicial 
error in rejecting the instruction and 
requiring the ex-president to prove 
that "but for" his exercise of free 
speech, he would not have been 
disciplined.
Serafinn was a three term 
president of a Local of the “Teamsters 
for a Democratic Union.” a "dissident 
faction" opposing the leadership of the 
International's current president, 
James P. Hoffa.  He claimed that his 
opponent in the 2001 election and the 
region's joint council president colluded 
to bring internal disciplinary charges 
against him for violating union rules 
by referring himself to a power plant 
job ahead of others on the Local's list, 
when their real motive was to punish 
him for meeting with local union
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executives and publishing a newslet-
ter critical of his opponent.  The Local 
argued that the discipline was solely 
for violations of the union's work-
referral rules.
A jury found that the Local had 
retaliated against the ex-president for 
exercising free speech in violation of 
the Landrum-Griffin Act, and awarded 
$50,000 in compensatory and $55,000 
in punitive damages.  The Local 
appealed, arguing that it was error 
to reject its "'mixed motive' jury 
instruction."
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court's decision, finding that 
because the court rejected the 
Serafinn’s proposed motivating-factor 
instruction, the Local's proposed 
liability-limiting mixed-motive in-
struction was not significant.  Citing 
the United States Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343, (2009), for 
the proposition that shifting the 
burden of persuasion is not permitted 
unless authorized by express statutory 
language, the Seventh Circuit held 
that because the district court was not 
allowed to alter the burden because not 
so-authorized by the Landrum-Griffin 
Act, its discretion was appropriately 
confined.
In  Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers, the Supreme Court held 
that the Seventh Circuit erred in 
holding that the National Railroad 
Adjustment Board violated constitu-
tional due process by dismissing sua 
sponte five employees' claims.  130 
S.Ct. 584 (Dec. 8, 2009) (affirming 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers and Trainmen General Com-
mittee of Adjustment, Central Region 
v. Union Pacific R.R., 522 F.3d 746 
(7th Cir. 2008).  A split panel of the 
NRAB had dismissed the employees' 
claims because there was no proof in 
the record to satisfy the Railway Labor 
Act's requirement of pre-arbitration 
"conferencing."
The RLA imposes conferencing as 
an intermediate step in its minor 
dispute resolution process before the 
parties proceed to arbitration.  The 
NRAB found this requirement was 
jurisdictional in nature, could not be 
waived, and therefore dismissed the 
employees' complaints.  The union 
brought a claim in the Northern 
District of Illinois to vacate the 
NRAB's award arguing that the 
conference requirement under the 
RLA was not jurisdictional and had in 
fact been waived by the employer.
The district court dismissed the 
union's complaint, the 7th Circuit 
reversed the dismissal, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment—but on statutory rather than 
constitutional grounds.  The Supreme 
Court specifically declined to resolve a 
constitutional question which has 
split the circuit courts of appeal: 
whether the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to review NRAB proceed-
ings for due process violations.
The Court reasoned that reaching 
that constitutional issue was not 
appropriate in this case because in 
section 152 of the RLA Congress had 
granted the NRAB jurisdiction to 
adjudicate grievances of railroad 
employees that remain unsettled after 
pursuit of internal procedures.   The 
conferencing requirement, which ap-
pears in section 153 of the RLA, was 
only a "claim processing rule" and not 
a jurisdictional limitation.  Because 
the NRAB does not have authority to 
decline the jurisdiction granted to it by 
Congress, the Court found that the 
NRAB's dismissal of the employee's 
claims on jurisdictional grounds 
clearly violated the express language 
of the RLA which requires the board 
"to conform, or confine itself, to 
matters within the scope of [its] 
jurisdiction."
In reaching this conclusion the 
Court found that the regulations 
promulgated by the NRAB and the 
prior decisions of the NRAB, which 
suggested that the conferencing
requirement may be jurisdictional in 
nature, were not controlling because 
"Congress alone controls the Board's 
jurisdiction," and "Congress gave the 
Board no authority to adopt rules of 
jurisdictional dimension."
In O'Neal v. City of Chicago Police 
Dept., 588 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 
2009), a female police officer ("O'Neal") 
sued the Chicago Police Department 
("CPD") under Title VII after being 
transferred out of the Narcotics unit, 
alleging race and gender discrimina-
tion.  As part of a settlement of a 
dispute over the collective bargaining 
agreement, O'Neal was later trans-
ferred back into the Narcotics unit, 
but was subsequently transferred an 
additional ten times among various 
units.  In 2007, O'Neal once again filed 
suit against the CPD, alleging that the 
transfers were in retaliation for her 
2002 law suit, and as well filed a 
charge of sex discrimination with the 
EEOC.  The district court entered 
summary judgment on the CPD's 
behalf, which O'Neal appealed.  The 
appellate court affirmed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment, 
noting that in both her retaliation and 
discrimination charges, her charges 
were time-barred except as to her two 
most recent transfers.
With regards to her retaliation 
claim, while the court found that
O'Neal had sufficiently alleged the 
first two prongs of a prima facie case —
that she had engaged in protected 
activity by filing suit in 2002 and 
again by filing a grievance in 2006 and 
that she had suffered an adverse action 
taken by the CPD in the form of her 
transfers-the court found that O'Neal 
had failed to present sufficient 
evidence that she had been transferred 
because of her protection actions.  The 
court found that under the direct 
method of proof, the evidence pre-
sented, in the form of statements from 
her Lieutenant calling her a "com-
plainer" and other similar names, and 
a previous statement by the same
11
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Lieutenant referring to O'Neal as 
having previously "dated a gang 
banger," did not amount to direct 
evidence when made without reference 
to O'Neal's protected actions. The 
court also found that O'Neal did not 
present sufficient evidence to fulfill the 
third prong under the indirect method 
of proof.  The court noted that under 
this method, O'Neal needed to present 
evidence that she met the CPD's 
legitimate expectations, that she was 
treated less favorably than similarly 
situated employees who did not engage 
in protected activity, and that any 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
CPD's adverse actions were pretextual. 
The court found that O'Neal was 
unable to provide sufficient evidence 
that she was meeting the CPD's 
legitimate expectations, because she 
failed to rebut the CPD's assertions 
that she was borderline insubordinate, 
had a confrontational attitude, and 
suffered from an inability to conduct 
street operations.
The court also found that O'Neal's 
sex discrimination charge failed 
because she was similarly unable to 
demonstrate a causal connection.
Courts continue to struggle with the 
proper interpretation of the Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2009.  The Act– the 
first piece of substantive legislation 
signed into law during the Obama 
administration– clearly overruled the 
Supreme Court's 2007 decision in 
Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 127 S. Ct 2162 (2007) which had 
held that a plaintiff who claimed 
unequal pay caused by long-ago 
discriminatory performance evalua-
tions could not base such a claim upon 
previous time-barred acts.  Yet the 
new law's scope remains unclear as to 
its application to a wide array of 
employment practices that directly or
indirectly result in continued unequal 
pay.
The differing interpretations stem 
from the statute's ambiguous phrase 
"a discriminatory compensation deci-
sion or other practice" which affects an 
employee's salary. The question with 
which  the federal courts have been 
struggling is whether the "other 
practice" attacked by the employee 
must itself be a practice related to the 
setting of compensation, as opposed to 
some other act (i.e a demotion, failure 
to promote, reassignment, etc.) that 
has merely an indirect relation to the 
employee's compensation.
 Many of the cases decided under the 
Act to date have concerned the 
troublesome issue of whether a 
plaintiff can claim unequal pay due to 
a long-ago promotion denial.  After all, 
an employee who failed to obtain a 
promotion ten years in the past may 
still, today, be receiving lower wages 
than if he or she had gained the 
promotion.  The first appellate court 
decision to address the promotion issue 
is Schuler v PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
LLP, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2998 
(D.C. Cir. 2010. There, the D.C Cir 
held that the employer's long-ago 
failure to promote the plaintiff to 
partner did not constitute "a compen-
sation decision or other practice" 
within the meaning of the new Act. 
The Court reasoned that "In employ-
ment law, the phrase ‘discrimination 
in compensation' means paying 
different wages or providing different 
benefits to similarly situated employ-
ees, not promoting one employee but 
not another to a more remunerative 
position." Id. at 9-10.
  The dispute is far from resolved, 
however, because district courts have 
split on the issue.  For example, in 
Gentry v. Jackson State University, 
610 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss. 2009), the 
Court held that a professor's time-
barred claim of denial of tenure did not 
prevent him from alleging unequal 
pay at present.  Similarly, a Florida 
court has held that lower pay caused
by a demotion that occurred 16 years 
in the past was actionable under the 
Act. Bush v. Orange County Correc-
tions Department, 597 F. Supp. 1293 
(M.D. Fla. 2009).
  Particularly troublesome for em-
ployers will be factual situations such 
as that involved in Mikula v Allegheny 
County, 583 F. Supp. 181 (3d Cir. 
2009). There, the Third Circuit held 
that the employee's unanswered 
request for a raise creates a perpetual 
cause of action under the new Act. 
Thus, informal requests for a raise or 
better job assignment may be seen as 
constituting an "other practice" under 
the new Act that provides a never-
ending cause of action for employees to 
challenge unequal pay. ?
Meaning of Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2009
Continued Confusion as to
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